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Matthew 0. after being while driving for supposedly failing to 
signal in violation of Idaho Code § 49-808(2), was accused of committing felony 
possession of a controlled substance. He filed a motion to suppress all evidence 
obtained by the State as a result of an unlawful search and seizure of Mr. Brooks and 
his vehicle. At a hearing on the motion to suppress, Mr. Brooks asserted that the traffic 
stop of his vehicle was unlawful because, although the stop had been based on 
Mr. supposed violation of 49-808(2), he never actually committed a 
of that district the motion to suppress. Pursuant to a 
conditional plea preservin~J right to appeal the denial of the motion to 
suppress, Mr. Brooks then pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance. The 
district court granted a withheld judgment and placed Mr. Brooks on probation for a 
period of three years. 
Mr. Brooks appealed, asserting that the district court erred when it denied his 
motion to suppress because the stop was in violation of his constitutional right to be free 
from unreasonable searches and seizures. His appeal centered on the issue of how 
long one must signal a lane change while driving on a controlled-access highway. 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State argued that Mr. Brooks did not show error in 
the denial of his motion to suppress, because the district court correctly applied the law 
to the facts in concluding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Brooks 
for violating Section 49-808(2), because Mr. Brooks did not signal for at least five 
seconds before changing lanes, and even if Mr. Brooks did not violate Section 49-
1 
808(2), the officer's mistake of was objectively and did not invalidate the 
stop. .) 
This Reply Brief is necessary to clarify that the stop of Mr. Brooks was not 
justified by reasonable suspicion at its inception, and that the officer's mistake of law 
rendered the stop per se unreasonable. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Brooks' Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
2 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. motion to su 
traffic stop was in violation of Mr. Brooks' constitutional right 




Traffic StoQ Was In Violation Of Mr. Brooks' Constitutional Right To Be Free From 
Unreasonable Searches And Seizures 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Brooks asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion to 
suppress, because the traffic stop was in violation of his constitutional right to be free 
from unreasonable searches and seizures. The stop was not justified at its inception 
because, while Trooper Higley's sole reason for initiating the stop was his belief that 
Mr. Brooks had committed a traffic violation by failing to signal a lane change for five 
seconds, supposedly in violation of I.C. § 49-808(2), under the plain language of 
Section 49-808(2) Mr. Brooks did not violate that statute. I.C. § 49-808(2) is an 
unambiguous statute requiring a five-second signal only when a driver is both on a 
controlled-access highway and turning from a parked position. Because Mr. Brooks did 
not violate Section 49-808(2), and Trooper Higley offered no other reason for initiating 
the stop, the stop was not justified at its inception by reasonable suspicion. 
Alternatively, if I.C. § 49-808(2) is ambiguous, it should be interpreted in favor of 
Mr. Brooks under the rule of lenity. If the statute is interpreted in Mr. Brooks' favor, he 
did not violate the statute and the stop was not justified by reasonable suspicion at its 
inception. In any event, Trooper Higley's misapprehension of Section 49-808(2) was a 
mistake of law that rendered the stop per se unreasonable. 
Thus, the law requires that any evidence gathered as a result of the unlawful 
traffic stop be suppressed. The district court therefore erred when it denied Mr. Brooks' 
motion to suppress. 
4 
B. 
Mr. Brooks Did Not Violate I. C. § 49-808(2) 
that the stop was not justified by reasonable suspicion its 
inception, because he did not violate I.C. § 49-808(2). Mr. Brooks did not violate 
Section 49-808(2), because its plain and unambiguous language requires a signal of not 
less than five seconds only where a vehicle driver is both on a controlled-access 
highway and turning from a parked position. 
Section 49-808(2) provides that: 
f\ signal of intention to turn or move right or 
given warn traffic. 
turning from 
continuously for not than (5) 
not than one hundred (1 00) 
turning. 
I.C. § 49-808(2). The district court determined that Mr. Brooks violated I.C. § 49-808(2) 
after interpreting the statute as requiring "that on controlled-access highways the signal 
shall be given continuously for not less than five (5) seconds." (R., pp.85 & n.1, 88.) 
"The interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of the statute; 
those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute 
must be construed as a whole." Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 
889, 893 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). "If the statute is not ambiguous, this 
Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written." /d. (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
Mr. Brooks submits that the district court's interpretation of the statute ignores the 
plain, usual, and ordinary meaning of the language of the statute, specifically the 
provision that "[o]n controlled-access highways and before turning from a parked 
5 
continuously for than five 
). plain, mean 
Inns, Inc. v. Pocatello-Chubbuck Auditorium or Cmty. Ctr. 
' 1 (2008); In re Brink, 117 Idaho & n (1990); State v. 
Gamino, 148 Idaho 830 (Ct. App. 201 0). According to the Idaho Supreme Court, 
word 'and' is a 'conjunction connecting words or phrases expressing the idea that 
latter is to be added to or taken along with the first."' Ameritellnns, Inc., 146 Idaho 
(quoting Black's Law Dictionary 86 (6th ed. 1990)). Thus, after giving the literal 
of their plain, , and ordinary meaning and construing the 
as a whole, ires a signal for not than 
if both: (1) giving the signal is on a controlled-access h and 
the person giving the signal is turning from a parked position. I.C. § 49-808(2). 
The State argues that "interpreting the word 'and' in Section 49-808(2) in its 
ordinarily understood conjunctive sense, and in the context of the entire statute, 
supports the district court's conclusion that the five-second signal requirement applies 
when a driver is moving right or left on a controlled-access highway and when he or she 
is turning from a parked position, not that both circumstances need be present before 
the five-second signal is required." (Resp. Br., p.9.) But by interpreting Section 49-
808(2) as having "two separate circumstances in which a five-second signal is required" 
(Resp. Br., p.1 0), the State would give "and" a disjunctive meaning, rather than its plain, 
usual, and ordinary conjunctive meaning. See Nava v. Rivas-Del Taro, 151 Idaho 853, 
858 n.3 & 860 (2011) (stating, in a case involving the interpretation of I. C. § 6-1607(2), 
that "the four circumstances in which the presumption of nonliability does not apply are 
6 
disjunctive. Therefore, if one of the circumstances the presumption 
not apply. It is to find that all of the circumstances exist"). 
Put otherwise, the would read the word "and" in the "[o]n controlled-access 
turning from a parked position" part of the statute as the word 
"or."1 See Mut. Tel. v. Idaho Tax Comm'n, 76 Idaho 1 (1955); v. 
Rivera, 1311daho8, 10(Ct. 1988). This would go against the precept from 
that "words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning." Verska, 151 Idaho 
at 893; see also MacDonald v. Pan Am. World Aitways, Inc., 859 F.2d 742, 746 (91h Cir. 
1988) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("\J\Je give our language, and our language-dependent 
legal a body blow when we hold that it is reasonable to 'or' for 'and."'). 
cases cited by the State do not support the State's interpretation of 
49-808(2). Contrary to the argument (Resp. Br., p.9), State v. Yzaguirre, 1 
Idaho 471 (2007), actually represents another example of Idaho's appellate courts 
giving the word "and" its plain, usual, and ordinary meaning. In Yzaguirre, a party to the 
litigation, not the Idaho Supreme Court as the State represents (see Resp. Br., p.9), 
advanced the interpretation that the word "and" in the phrase "[t]o consider and advise 
its legal representatives in pending litigation ... enumerates two separate purposes." 
Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho at 475. The Yzaguirre Court adopted an entirely different 
interpretation, holding that the plain interpretation of the statute was that: "An executive 
1 To the extent that the State argues that the word "and" in its "ordinarily understood 
conjunctive sense" may be read as denoting "two separate circumstances" (see Resp. 
Br., pp.9-1 0), that argument fails. "As a linguistic matter, 'and' and 'or' are not 
synonyms; indeed, they are more nearly antonyms. One need only start the day with a 
breakfast of ham or eggs to be duly impressed by the difference." MacDonald v. Pan 
Am. World Aitways, Inc., 859 F.2d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 1988) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis in original). 
7 
session may be held: (1) to consider, and its legal representatives in, pending 
litigation; or (2) where there is a general public awareness of probable litigation." /d. 
at 475-76. 
Thus, the Yzaguirre Court used the plain, usual, and ordinary meaning of "and," 
to connect "consider" with "advise its legal representatives in" under one circumstance. 
See id. at 4 76. The Court also held that "where there is general public awareness of 
probable litigation . . . constitutes a separate and independent circumstance under 
which executive sessions may be held." /d. Contrary to the State's argument that there 
are two separate circumstances linked by "and" in the first part of the second sentence 
of Section 49~808(2) (see Resp. , p.1 0), the two separate and independent 
circumstances in the Yzaguirre statute were linked by a disjunctive "or," not a 
conjunctive "and." Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho at 476. 
The Yzaguirre Court further rejected the State's argument that the word 
"consider" in the first part of the statute should not be given its plain, usual, and ordinary 
meaning. The State advocated its own interpretation of the statute that would allow a 
governing body to "consider its legal representatives." !d. But the Court rejected that 
interpretation: "The State's interpretation would read 'consider' to mean 'consult.' It 
strains the ordinary meaning of 'consider.' The result urged by the State cannot be 
reconciled with the text of the statute." /d. Thus, Yzaguirre actually undermines the 
State's argument in this case that words such as "and" should not be given their plain, 
usual, and ordinary meaning. 
The State also notes that the Idaho Supreme Court at one point observed that 
"'[t]he word 'and' in a statute may be read 'or,' and vice versa, whenever the change is 
8 
to the statute sense and or its different parts, or carry 
evident of the 13 (quoting v. Enking, 
59 Idaho 1, 82 P.2d 649, 661 (1 938).) However, Enking predates the Idaho Supreme 
Court's decision in Verska. As discussed above, the Verska Court held that: 'The 
interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words 
must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be 
construed as a whole." Verska, 151 Idaho at 893 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The Verska Court also rejected "the contention that we could revise an unambiguous 
statute because we believed it was absurd or would produce absurd results .... " /d. at 
896. Thus, to the that Enking conflicts with Verska through permitting to 
not be given their plain, usual and ordinary meaning, or through permitting the revision 
of unambiguous statutes (like the one here) to give them "sense and effect," 
i.e., to avoid absurdity or absurd results, Verska would control as the more recent Idaho 
Supreme Court opinion.2 See State v. Goodlett, 139 Idaho 262, 265 (Ct. App. 2003) 
(holding that, in the event of a conflict between two opinions, the more recent opinion 
controls with respect to any conflict between them). 
Nor does K Mart Corp. v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 111 Idaho 719 (1986), 
support the State's argument that "and" should be read as "or" in this case. While the 
Idaho Supreme Court in K Mart interpreted the word "and" in I.C. § 63-3622 as 
indicating that the "statute exempts two types of tangible personal property," id. at 721, 
2 The State cites cases from other jurisdictions in support of its use of Enking. (Resp. 
Br., p.13.) However, unlike Idaho after the Verska decision, those jurisdictions allow a 
court to depart from the literal interpretation of the language of an unambiguous statute 
to avoid "absurd results." See State v. Beck, 614 S.E. 274, 277 (N.C. 2005); People v. 
9 
that decision also predated Verska. Again, holds "words must be given 
their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning." Verska, 151 Idaho at 893 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Thus, to the extent that K Mart conflicts with Verska, Verska would 
control. See Goodlett, 139 Idaho at 265. 
Even if the departure from the plain, usual, and ordinary meaning of "and" in 
K Mart remains valid after Verska, that departure only came about because of the 
mutually exclusive nature of the two types of property exempted. See K Mart Corp., 
111 Idaho at 721-22. Specifically, the two types of property were "the property that 
becomes a component part of property sold at retail and property used or consumed in 
the production of property sold retail." /d. at 721. The two types of property were 
mutually exclusive because property that became a component part of property sold 
retail could not also be property used or consumed in the production of property sold at 
retail, or vice versa. See id.; id. at 724 (Bakes, J., dissenting) (contrasting advertising 
inserts as a component of a newspaper from the ink and paper used in the production of 
the newspaper). 
Some other jurisdictions have recognized that, while "and" almost always takes 
on its plain, usual, and ordinary conjunctive meaning,3 in rare instances it may be read 
as having a disjunctive meaning because it links two mutually exclusive concepts. See 
OfficeMax, Inc. v. United States, 428 F.3d 583, 588 (6th Cir. 2005) (discussing 26 U.S.C. 
§ 4251, which "defines 'communications services' as 'local telephone service, toll 
Hanna, 800 N.E.2d 1201, 1207 (Ill. 2003); People v. Broussard, 856 P.2d 1134,1136 
~Cal. 1993); State v. Flowers, 225 P.3d 476,478 (Wash. App. 2010). 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in OfficeMax, Inc. v. United 
States, 428 F.3d 583 (6th Cir. 2005), stated that "dictionary definitions, legal usage 
10 
telephone and teletypewriter exchange "as using in a disjunctive 
or cumulative sense definitions of the in § are generally 
mutually exclusive and because no that can satisfy all three definitions 
once" (emphasis in original)); Peacock v. Lubbock Compress Co., 892, 893 
Cir. 1958) (interpreting a provision referring to "an employer engaged in ... the 
ginning and compression of cotton" as disjunctive, because "compressing is an 
operation entirely removed from ginning and ... the two are never carried on together"). 
Thus, because the two types of property exempted by the statute in K Mart were 
mutually exclusive, this narrow exception the Court could read "and" as "or." 
K Corp., 111 Idaho at 721 
In contrast to the two exemptions in the K there is nothing mutually 
exclusive about the phrases in the part of Section 49-808(2) outlining the five-
second requirement. A vehicle could be both "[oJn a controlled-access highway" and 
"before turning from a parked position."4 For example, a vehicle could be halted on the 
shoulder of a controlled-access highway while not loading or unloading property or 
passengers. Under the statutory definitions, such a vehicle would be both "[o]n a 
controlled-access highway" and "before turning from a parked position." See I.C. §§ 40-
1 09(5)(b); 49-117(1 ). Thus, K Mart does not support the State's argument that "and" in 
Section 49-808(2) should be read as "or," because there is nothing mutually exclusive 
guides and case law compel us to start from the premise that 'and' usually does not 
mean 'or."' OfficeMax, Inc., 428 F.3d at 588. 
4 See I. C. I. C. § 49-1 09(5)(b) ("defining "controlled-access highway"); I. C. § 49-117(1) 
(defining "park" or "parking" as "the standing of a vehicle, whether occupied or not, other 
than temporarily for the purpose of and while actually engaged in loading or unloading 
property or passengers"); I.C. § 49-120(23) (defining "stand" or "standing" as "the 
11 
about a vehicle being both "[o]n a controlled-access highway" and "before turning from a 
position." 
The State's "grammatical" argument is also unavailing. The State attempts to 
distinguish the cases where Idaho's appellate courts have used the plain, usual, and 
ordinary meaning of "and" from this case on the basis that the statutes in the prior cases 
used "and" to "join together items in a conjunctive list" or "two unmodified verbs," while 
the statute here uses "and" to "join[] together two independent prepositional phrases." 
(Resp. Br., pp.1 0-11.) But the State's so-called "strict grammatical reading of the 
statute" (Resp. Br., p.1 0), ignores the plain, usual, and ordinary meaning of "and." As 
the Supreme Court held, 'The word 'and' is a 'conjunction connecting or 
the that the latter is to added or taken along with the 
first."' Ameritel Inns, Inc., 1 Idaho at 205 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary (6 111 
1990)) (emphasis added). Nothing in Idaho's jurisprudence on statutory interpretation 
precludes the use of the word "and" to link two phrases, prepositional or otherwise. 
Thus, given its plain, usual, and ordinary meaning, "and" connects the two phrases in 
the first part of the second sentence of Section 49-808(2) and expresses the idea that 
the latter phrase is to be added to or taken along with the first phrase. See id. 
Additionally, the State's argument that the plain interpretation of Section 49-
808(2) advocated by Mr. Brooks would "render portions of the statute superfluous" 
(Resp. Br., p.13), fails. The State contends that under the plain interpretation of the 
statute, where "the five-second signal requirement ... only applies to drivers who are 
both 'on controlled-access highways' and 'turning from a parked position,' the 'or move 
halting of a vehicle, whether occupied or not, otherwise than temporarily for the purpose 
12 
right or left' language contained in the first sentence of the be no 
Br., p.14.) This argument also ignores the Idaho Supreme Cou 
Verska . In Verska, the Court observed that "effect must be given to all the 
of the statute if possible, so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant." 
Verska, 151 Idaho at 897 (internal quotation marks omitted). But the Verska Court 
further stated that "the statute must be construed as a whole." /d. at 893. In another 
recent case, the Idaho Supreme Court stated, "Provisions should not be read in 
isolation, but must be interpreted in the context of the entire document." State v. 
Schulz, 151 863, 866 (20 11) (quoting Farber v. Idaho Ins. Fund, 14 7 Idaho 
307,310 
argument the plain interpretation of I.C. § 49-808(2) would 
render parts of the statute superfluous ignores those above Section 49-
808(2) mandates how long or for what distance a signal must be given "when required." 
I. C. § 49-808(2). The "when required" language refers to Section 49-808(1 ), which 
governs when a signal is required: "No person shall turn a vehicle onto a highway or 
move a vehicle right or left upon a highway or merge onto or exit from a highway unless 
and until the movement can be made with reasonable safety nor without giving an 
appropriate signal." I. C. § 49-808(1 ). Thus, the plain interpretation of Section 49-808(2) 
would not render any part of the statute superfluous, because persons would still be 
required to signal as required in Section 49-808(1) and (2). 
Under the plain, usual, and ordinary meaning of the language of I. C. § 49-808(2), 
a five-second signal must be given only when the person giving the signal is both (1) on 
of and while actually engaged in receiving or discharging passengers"). 
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a h turning from a parked position. I 
"[l]n all other given "for not less than the one hundred 
(1 traveled turning." !d. This interpretation of 49-
is the only interpretation of the language of the statute, and thus the 
is unambiguous. Verska, 151 Idaho at 893, 
By interpreting statute so as require a five-second signal when person 
giving the signal is only "[o]n a controlled-access highway," the State, much like the 
district court, ignores the plain, usual, ordinary meaning of the language of Section 
49-808(2). Interpreting the word "and" in the phrase "[o]n controlled-access highways 
turning from a parked a disjunctive " rather than the 
usual, and ord 
surgery" on 
117 Idaho 56-57. 
conjunctive meaning of "and," would be prohibited "open 
"[h]ealthy of an unambiguous statute. Brink, 
Under the plain interpretation of I.C. § 49-808(2), Mr. Brooks did not commit a 
violation of the statute. When Mr. Brooks made the lane change, he was not both (1) on 
a controlled-access highway and (2) turning from a parked position, and thus he was 
not required by I.C. § 49-808(2) to signal for not less than five seconds. In fact, 
Mr. Brooks complied with the "all other instances" language of Section 49-808(2), 
because he signaled for approximately 160 feet. (See R., p.85 & n.1.) Mr. Brooks 
therefore did not violate I. C. § 49-808(2). 
Because Mr. Brooks did not violate I.C. § 49-808(2), Trooper Higley did not have 
a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify initiating the traffic stop. Trooper 
Higley testified that the sole reason for the stop was because Mr. Brooks had violated 
14 
49-808(2) by signaling for five Without the violation of 49-
the trooper had no grounds for initiating the stop. Thus, the stop was not 
justified by reasonable suspicion at its inception. 
C. If I.C. § 49-808(2) Is Ambiguous, It Should Be Interpreted In Favor Of Mr. Brooks 
Under The Rule Of Lenity 
Should this Court disagree with Mr. Brooks' assertion that I.C. § 49-808(2) is 
unambiguous and instead determine that the is ambiguous, Mr. Brooks asserts 
that Section 49-808(2) should be interpreted in his favor under the rule of lenity. If the 
statute is interpreted in Mr. Brooks' favor, did not violate the statute and the stop was 
not justified by reasonable suspicion its inception. 
"A is where the is of more than one 
construction." 151 Idaho 896. When an appellate court must 
engage in statutory construction because of an ambiguity in a statute, "it has the duty to 
ascertain the legislative intent, and give effect to that intent." State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 
459, 462 (1999). "To ascertain the intent of the legislature, not only must the literal 
words of the statute be examined, but also the context of those words, the public policy 
behind the statute and its legislative history." /d. Constructions of an ambiguous statute 
that would lead to absurd results are disfavored. See State v. Doe, 140 Idaho 271, 
275 (2004). 
However, "where the ambiguity exists as to the elements of or potential sanctions 
for a crime, this Court will strictly construe the statute in favor of the defendant." /d. at 
274. "The rule of lenity requires that ambiguous criminal statutes should be read 
narrowly and be construed in favor of the defendant." State v. Jones, 151 Idaho 943, 
94 7 (Ct. App. 2011 ). "[T]his rule does not require a court to disregard the purpose of a 
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statute when it is clear from the context." /d. (citing State v. Hale, 116 Idaho 763, 766 
(Ct. App. 1989)). The Idaho Court of Appeals recently clarified that "where a review of 
the legislative history makes the meaning of the statute clear, the rule of lenity will not 
be applied." State v. Alley, 155 Idaho 972, 318 P.3d 962, 966 (Ct. App. 2014) (citing 
State v. Bradshaw, 155 Idaho 437, 440 (Ct. App. 2013); Jones, 151 Idaho at 947). "If 
the ambiguity remains after examining the text, context, history, and policy of the 
statute, the interpretative tie between the two or more reasonable readings is resolved 
in favor of the defendant." State v. Trusda/1, 155 Idaho 965, 318 P.3d 955, 959 (Ct. 
App. 2014) (citing Bradshaw, 155 Idaho at 440-41).5 
If I.C. § 49-808(2) is ambiguous, the rule of lenity is applicable The 
ambiguity remains even after an examination of the legislative history, text, context, and 
policy of the statute. See Trusda/1, 155ldaho 965,318 P.3d at 959. 
The legislative history does not make the meaning of Section § 49-808(2) clear. 
While the State's argument does not address the legislative history of the statute (see 
Resp. Br., pp.15-19), Idaho's appellate courts have identified legislative history as a 
factor in interpreting ambiguous statutes. Rhode, 133 Idaho at 462; Alley, 155 Idaho 
972, 318 P.3d at 966. The legislative history here does not clarify the meaning of the 
statute. Section 49-808(2) was initially enacted as part of former I.C. § 49-664. See 
1977 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 52, pp.370-71. The preface to the bill passed by the Idaho 
Legislature to enact former Section 49-664 stated: "An act providing a recodification and 
revision of Chapters 5, 6, and 7, Title 49, Idaho Code, the rules of the road for motor 
vehicles ... amending Title 49, Idaho Code, by the addition of a new Chapter 6, Title 
5 At the time the Appellant's Brief was filed, the parties did not have the benefit of the 
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Idaho . . providing regulations for turning and starting and signals on 
stopping and turning .... " 1977 Idaho ch. This general 
of legislative intent provides no insight into the intended meaning of the 
statute, or into the intended meaning of "and" with respect to the five-second signal 
requirement. See Alley, 155 Idaho 972, 318 P.3d at 968-69. 
The preface to the bill passed by the Legislature to amend the statute to its 
current designation of I.C. § 49-808 is also of little assistance, as it stated: "An act 
relating to recodification of the motor vehicle laws ... amending Sections ... 49-661 
through 49-666 ... to redesignate the sections and to recodification." 1 Idaho 
Laws, ch. pp.549-550. Again, this general statement of legislative intent 
not clarify the meaning of Section 49-808(2) or indicate the intended meaning of 
"and" in the statute. See Alley, 155 Idaho 972, 318 P.3d at 968-69. Thus, the 
legislative history does not clarify the purpose of the statute or make its meaning clear. 
'Turning to the surrounding text and context in which the term was used," see id., 
the text and context, if anything, supports Mr. Brooks' interpretation of Section 49-
808(2). The context of the part of the statute at issue here includes I. C. § 49-808(1 ), 
which governs when a signal is required. Subsection (1) includes the term "and" in the 
phrase "unless and until," using it in its plain, usual, and ordinary meaning to connect 
two words. See A me rite/ Inns, Inc., 146 Idaho at 205. Thus, the context indicates that 
"and" in the part of (2) at issue here is also used with its plain, usual, and ordinary 
meaning. See Alley, 155 Idaho 972, 318 P.3d at 969 (determining the meaning of the 
Alley and Trusdal/ decisions. 
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ambiguous term in one part of I.C. § 37-2705 by reading the whole statute at 
including another part of Section 37-2705 where "athyl" also appeared). 
Further, Section 49-808('1) features several uses of the word "or" to designate 
that each circumstance described in that part of the statute is a separate circumstance 
when a signal is required. See Filer Mut. Tel. Co., 76 Idaho at 261; Rivera, 131 Idaho 
·1 0. Had the legislature intended for the first part of the second sentence of Section 49-
808(2) to similarly demarcate two separate circumstances requiring a five-second 
signal, it would have used "or" to designate the two phrases in the first part as separate 
circumstances as it did with the separate circumstances in Section 49-808(1 ), rather 
than the two with "and." Thus, if anything, the surrounding and 
context of Section 49-808(2) supports Mr. Brooks' interpretation. 
The policy of I.C. § 49-808(2) not clarify the meaning of the word "and" in 
the part of the statute at issue, or the meaning of the statute. The State argues that 
"[t]he obvious purpose of I. C. § 49-808(2) is to promote the safety of motorists traveling 
on Idaho's highways." (Resp. Br., p.15.) According to the State, its interpretation of the 
statute should control because it better facilitates that purpose than the plain 
interpretation. (See Resp. Br., pp.15-16.) But even if the policy behind Section 49-
808(2) is motorist safety, it does not follow that the policy clarifies the meaning of the 
statute. A reasonable interpretation does not clarify the meaning of an ambiguous 
statute just because it would be more comprehensive than another reasonable 
interpretation when it comes to addressing an underlying policy of the statute. See 
Alley, 155 Idaho 972, 318 P.3d at 964-69 (holding that the rule of lenity applied to 
exclude the chemical AM-2201 from the list of chemicals expressly enumerated in I.C. 
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§ 37-2705(d)(30)(ii)(a), even though including the chemical under a more 
comprehensive interpretation would arguably reflect the legislative intent ban all 
chemicals used in spice that mimic the effects of marijuana, including AM-2201 ," 
because the ambiguity in the term "alkyl" was unresolved "by the surrounding text, 
context, or legislative history of the statute"). Thus, the policy of Section 49-808(2) does 
not make the meaning of the statute clear. 
Because any ambiguity in the meaning of Section 49-808(2) or in the meaning of 
the word "and" in the statute is not resolved by the statute's legislative history, 
surrounding text, context, or policy, the rule of lenity applies. See Alley, 1 Idaho 972, 
318 P.3d at Further, no would result if Mr. Brooks' interpretation were 
imposed. id., 318 P.3d at 969. Contrary to the State's argument (see Resp. Br., 
pp.15-18), the plain interpretation would not lead to absurd results. As discussed 
above, the State's argument that Mr. Brooks' interpretation would allow drivers to turn 
without giving any signal (see Resp. Br., p.17) ignores Section 49-808(1) of the statute. 
Drivers would still be required to signal according to Section 49-808(1) and (2). 
Additionally, Mr. Brooks' interpretation does not lead to absurd results because it 
would require a signal of 100 feet for motorists driving on controlled-access highways 
(see Resp. Br., pp.17-18), considering many other jurisdictions have a universal 100 
feet signal requirement for a// turns or movements upon a roadway. 6 While the State 
6 See, e.g., Ala. Code § 32-5A-133(b) ("A signal of intention to turn right or left when 
required shall be given continuously during not less than the last 100 feet traveled by 
the vehicle before turning."); Haw. Rev. Stat.§ 291C-84(b) (substantially the same, but 
with special provisions for bicycles and mopeds); Kan. Stat. § 8-1548(b) (substantially 
the same as Alabama, but containing "turn or move" language); Ky. Rev. Stat. 
§ 189.380(2); N.D. Cent. Code§ 39-10-38(2); N.H. Rev. Stat.§ 265:45(2); N.Y. Veh. & 
Traf. Law § 1163(b); S.C. Code § 56-5-2150(b); Tex. Transp. Code. § 545.1 04(b); 23 
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argues that Mr. interpretation of Section 49-808(2) would "perverse 
results" (Resp. Br., pp.17~18), the statutes in those other jurisdictions indicate that a 
100 feet signal requirement is widely to promote motorist safety. Following 
the State's argument (see Resp. Br., p.16), Section 49-808(2) would actually enhance 
motorist safety when compared to a universal 100 feet signal requirement, because it 
would give motorists more notice and time to react in the vulnerable circumstance 
where a vehicle is turning on a controlled-access highway from a parked position. 7 
Motorists turning from a parked position while not on a controlled-access 
highway would still be required to signal according to Section 49-808(1 ). See I. C. § 49-
808(1) ("1\Jo person shall turn a vehicle onto a highway or move a vehicle right or left 
upon a highway ... without giving an appropriate signal.") In sum, Brooks' 
interpretation would not lead to any absurdity or absurd results. 
Thus, if this Court determines that I.C. § 49-808(2) is ambiguous, the statute 
should be interpreted in favor of Mr. Brooks under the rule of lenity. If Section 49-808(2) 
Vt. Stat.§ 1064(d); Wash. Rev. Code§ 46.61.305(2); Wyo. Stat.§ 31-5-217(b); cf. La. 
Rev. Stat. § 32:104 (requiring a 100-foot signal for a turn "which will take [a] vehicle 
from the highway it is then traveling"); Utah Code § 41-6a-804(1 )(b) ("A signal of 
intention to turn right or left or to change lanes shall be given continuously for at least 
the last two seconds preceding the beginning of the movement."). 
But see Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-903(2) (requiring that a signal be given "for at 
least two hundred feet on all four-lane highways and other highways where the prima 
facie or posted speed limit is more than forty miles per hour"); 21 Del. Code§ 4155(b) 
("A signal of intention to turn or move right or left when required shall be given 
continuously during not less than the last 300 feet or more than Yz mile traveled by the 
vehicle before turning."); Ill. Camp. Stat. 5/11-804(b) (requiring a 200-foot signal "before 
turning outside a business or residence district"). 
7 Contrary to the prosecutor's contention before the district court that "[d]rivers do not 
'park' on a freeway," (see Resp. Br., pp.16-17), a person could be "parked" on a 
controlled-access highway under the statutory definition if "they break down, pull over 
and stop or run out of gas." See I.C. § 49-117(1). 
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is in Mr. he did the and the stop was not 
justified by reasonable suspicion at its inception. 
D. 
No matter whether I.C. § 49-808(2) is unambiguous or ambiguous, Mr. Brooks 
did not commit a violation of the statute. As discussed above, Trooper Higley's sole 
reason for the stop was his belief that Mr. Brooks had violated the statute, based on his 
misapprehension of I.C. § 49-808(2). Mr. Brooks asserts that Trooper Higley's 
misapprehension of I.C. § 49-808(2) was a mistake of law, and his mistake of law 
rendered the per se unreasonable. 
Mr. that an officer's of a detention 
se unreasonable, i.e., invalidate a search or 
Resp. Br., p.20), this is the approach taken by majority of federal and state 
courts that have directly addressed the issue. (See App. Br., pp.21 ) A minority of 
those courts have taken the other approach, holding that an officer's mistake of law, like 
a mistake of fact, can be objectively reasonable. (See App. Br., pp.22-23.) 
Mr. Brooks submits that this Court should adopt the majority approach and hold 
that an officer's mistake of law renders a detention per se unreasonable. The State 
argues that this Court instead should adopt the minority approach.8 (Resp. Br., pp.21-
8 The State's arguments for the minority approach rely in large part on the North 
Carolina Supreme Court's decision in State v. Heien, 737 S.E.2d 351 (N.C. 2012). (See 
Resp. Br., pp.20-25.) However, the United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari 
in the Heien case. State v. Heien, 749 S.E.2d 278 (N.C. 2013), cert. granted, Heien v. 
North Carolina, 134 S. Ct. 1872 (U.S. Apr. 21, 2014) (No. 13-604). The question 
presented is: "Whether a police officer's mistake of law can provide the individualized 
suspicion that the Fourth Amendment requires to justify a traffic stop." See Petition for 
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) But the State's arguments only provide further grounds for why this rt should 
adopt the majority approach. 
Only the majority approach fulfills the reasonableness requirement of Fourth 
Amendment. "The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness." United 
States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001 ). The legal justification for a detention "must 
be objectively grounded," United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 279 (5ih Cir. 1998), and 
a detention based on a mistake of law is not objectively grounded or objectively 
reasonable. See United States v. McDonald, 453 F.3d 958, 961 (ih Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Tibbetts, 396 F.3d 1132, 1138 (1oth Cir. 2005). 
As articulated by the the minority approach merely pays lip service to the 
reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. The State notes Br., 
p.25), that the United States Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment 
not require "factual accuracy." See 1//inois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185 (1990). "[l]n 
order to satisfy the 'reasonableness' requirement of the Fourth Amendment, what is 
generally demanded of the many factual determinations that must regularly be made by 
agents of the government ... is not that they always be correct, but that they always be 
reasonable." /d. (emphasis added). In the context of factual mistakes, "sufficient 
probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth 
Amendment." See Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1971 ). Because officers 
may encounter ambiguous situations, "room must be allowed for some mistakes on their 
part. But the mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading 
a Writ of Certiorari, Heien v. North Carolina, No. 13-604 (Nov. 13, 2013), 2013 WL 
6091788 at *i. 
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1 ( 1 
their conclusions of probability." Brinegar v. United 
(emphasis added). 
u . 1 
However, the same constitutional standard that allows for mistakes of fact to 
reasonable does not allow for mistakes of law to be reasonable. After the determination 
of historical facts, the reasonable suspicion analysis involves a mixed question of law 
and fact: "The historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, 
and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the relevant statutory or constitutional 
standard, or to put it another way, whether the rule of law as applied to the established 
facts is or is not violated." Ornelas v. United States, 517 U 690, 696-97 (1 
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks alterations omitted). Thus, the 
whether the law was violated, not whether an officer's mistaken conception of 
the law was violated. See id. 
"The relevant question, in a case such as this one, is: Against what interpretation 
of the law should we assess the facts when deciding whether there was reasonable 
suspicion ... to make a traffic stop?" United States v. Nicholson, 721 F.3d 1236, 1244 
(1 01h Cir. 2013). The minority approach would "require courts to assess whether there 
are ... any incorrect (but reasonable) interpretations of our laws that might justify the 
government's assertion that an officer had observed sufficient facts to establish 
reasonable suspicion." See id. at 1244 n.8. But Orne/as forecloses this requirement, 
because the reasonable suspicion analysis involves "whether the rule of law as applied 
to the established facts is or is not violated." See Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696-97. The 
majority approach is in accord with Orne/as, because it "judge[s] the facts against the 
correct interpretation of the law, as opposed to any other interpretation, even if arguably 
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a reasonable one. See Nicholson, 1 F.3d 1244. Thus, only the majority approach 
fulfills the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 
The majority approach maintains the separation of powers between the three 
departments of Idaho's government. Idaho's government is "divided into three distinct 
departments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or collection of 
persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these 
departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others, 
except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted." Idaho Canst. Art. II, § 1. 
The minority approach favored by the State would threaten the separation of powers. 
Law enforcement officers, as part of the executive branch, would essentially usurp the 
lawmaking powers of the legislature under the minority approach, validating 
detentions based on mistakes of law due to any sort of ambiguity in a statute would 
"sweep behavior into the statute which the authors of the statute may have had in mind 
but failed to put into the plain language of the statute." See United States v. 
Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1278 (11th Cir. 2003); Idaho Canst. Art Ill,§ 1. 
While the State did not directly address the separation of powers issue (see 
Resp. Br., pp.19-27), it touched upon another way the minority approach would threaten 
the separation of powers. According to the State, the majority approach involves 
"[p]reventing officers from reasonably interpreting the laws upon which they base traffic 
stops." (See Resp. Br., p.24.) Thus, the State suggests that officers would be allowed 
to interpret the laws they enforce under the minority approach. (See Resp. Br., pp.23-
24.) However, the State also admits that "law enforcement officers are charged with 
enforcing the law, not deciding its precise scope." (Resp. Br., p.24.) Indeed, it is the 
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the judicial branch, not executive branch, to interpret the law. The Idaho 
Constitution all judicial and jurisdiction in the Idaho Supreme Court, and it 
is that it is the duty of the Court interpret the law." Mead v. Arnell, 117 Idaho 
660,669 (1990); see Idaho Canst. Art II,§ 1, Art. V, §§ 2 & 13. 
By permitting officers to interpret the very laws they are charged with enforcing, 
the minority approach advocated by the State would have the executive department 
usurp not only the role of the legislature but also that of the judiciary. Thus, the minority 
approach would threaten the separation of powers. In contrast, the majority approach 
maintains the separation of powers, properly leaving it to the legislature to make the law 
and the courts to interpret the law. Idaho Canst. Art. II, § 1. 
Additionally, the majority approach treats officers and citizens with fundamental 
fairness. "As a rule, if a defendant is presumed to know the law, we must as 
much from law enforcement." United States v. Orduna-Martinez, 561 F .3d 1134, 1137 
n.2 (1oth Cir. 2009). Conversely, the minority approach treats officers and citizens with 
fundamental unfairness. While, on the one hand, the minority approach elevates law 
enforcement officers into a position where they can make and interpret the laws they 
are charged with enforcing, on the other hand, the minority approach contends that 
"officers are not trained in the intricacies of the substantive law and, as such, cannot be 
expected to interpret the traffic laws with the subtlety and expertise of a criminal 
defense attorney." (Resp. Br., p.23 (internal quotation marks omitted).) The idea that 
officers who are ignorant of the law should be allowed to interpret the law illustrates "the 
fundamental unfairness of holding citizens to 'the traditional rule that ignorance of the 
law is no excuse,' Bryan v. United States, [524 U.S. 184, 196 (1998)], while allowing 
25 
'entrusted to enforce' the law to ignorant of it." Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 
1 
Although the contends that the minority approach is more consistent 
because it "allows reviewing courts to treat all police mistakes the same" (see Resp. Sr., 
p.25 (internal quotations omitted)), the fundamental unfairness of allowing law 
enforcement officers to be ignorant of the law while not providing a similar privilege to 
citizens shows that the minority approach suffers from a basic inconsistency. In 
contrast, the majority approach treats mistakes by law enforcement officers and citizens 
consistently. Under the majority approach, an officer's mistake of law would not justify a 
, much like a ignorance the would not serve as a defense. See 
Tibbetts, F.3d at 1138; v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 926 (1 993) ("Ignorance of the 
law is not a defense."). Conversely, an officer's reasonable mistake of fact could justify 
a detention, just as a citizen's reasonable mistake of fact could serve as a defense. 
See State v. Horton, 150 Idaho 300, 302 (Ct. App. 2010); I. C. § 18-201 (1) (providing 
that the class of persons who acted "under an ignorance or mistake of fact which 
disproves any criminal intent" are not capable of committing crimes). 
Further, the minority approach would not even achieve what the State purports it 
would accomplish: not all police mistakes in Idaho would be treated the same. The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has adopted the majority approach, 
holding that an officer's good-faith but mistaken belief that a motorist committed a traffic 
violation does not justify a stop under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Lopez-
Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000). Thus, under the minority approach a mistake 
of law by an Idaho law enforcement officer would not justify a stop in federal court, but it 
26 
could in Not only would the minority be inconsistent when it came 
to treating as opposed to citizens, it inconsistent when it came to 
police mistakes. The majority approach rightfully avoids these inconsistencies. 
Finally, the majority approach preserves Idaho's exclusionary rule. The majority 
approach preserves Idaho's exclusionary rule both through providing an incentive for 
police to properly understand the law, see Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d at 1106, and through 
precluding a "good-faith" exception to Idaho's exclusionary rule. 
Although the State does not directly argue for it as such (see Resp. Br., pp.22-
23), the minority approach is tantamount to a good-faith exception to Idaho's 
exclusionary rule. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1106. As the State acknowledges 
a good-faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule under Article I, § ·17 the Idaho Constitution. v. Koivu, 152 
Idaho 511 (2012); State v. Guzman, 1 Idaho 981 (1 992). To the extent that the 
minority approach would conflict with the Idaho Supreme Court's recent decision in 
Koivu, the minority approach should be rejected. 
Contrary to the State's argument (see Resp. Br., p.23), Idaho's exclusionary rule 
is not based on the level of the intrusion into an individual's privacy. For example, Koivu 
explained that, in the earlier decision State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43 (1 927), "the Court 
made it clear that the evidence unlawfully obtained should be excluded simply because 
it was obtained in violation of the defendant's constitutional rights." Koivu, 152 Idaho at 
488 (citing Arregui, 44 Idaho at 57-58). Justice Bistline, the author of Guzman, 9 stated: 
9 The Court in Koivu noted that a majority of the Guzman Court "rejected the good-faith 
exception, but a majority did not agree upon the reasons for doing so." Koivu, 152 
Idaho at 518. 
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[T]he exclusionary rule should applied in order to: 1) provide an 
effective remedy to persons who have been subjected to an unreasonable 
government search and/or 2) deter the police from acting 
unlawfully in obtaining evidence; 3) encourage thoroughness in the 
warrant issuing process; 4) avoid having the judicial commit an additional 
constitutional violation by considering evidence which has been obtained 
through illegal means; and 5) preserve judicial integrity. 
Guzman, 122 Idaho at 993. None of the above cases couched the basis for the 
exclusionary rule in terms of only covering, as the State suggests, the most "inherently 
invasive" searches. (See Resp. Br., p.23.) Rather, "Idaho had clearly developed an 
exclusionary rule as a constitutionally mandated remedy for illegal searches and 
seizures in addition to other purposes behind the rule such as recognizing the 
exclusionary rule as a deterrent for police misconduct." v. Donato, 135 Idaho 
4 72 (2001 ). Idaho's exclusionary rule is not based on the level of the intrusion into an 
individual's privacy. 
The State also minimizes the level of intrusion inherent in a traffic stop. (See 
Resp. Br., pp.22-23). "Although a vehicle stop is limited in magnitude compared to 
other types of seizures, it is nonetheless a 'constitutionally cognizable' intrusion and 
therefore may not be conducted 'at the unbridled discretion of law enforcement 
officials.'" State v. Ramirez, 145 Idaho 886, 889 (Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979)). Idaho's exclusionary rule "is a judicially created 
remedy for searches and seizures that violate the Constitution." Koivu, 152 Idaho at 
518. Because a traffic stop is a constitutionally cognizable intrusion, Idaho's 
exclusionary rule is available as a remedy for illegal traffic stops. See Koivu, 152 Idaho 
at 518; Donato, 1351daho at472. 
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In its Koivu , the Court that 
not shown any overruling and holding 
exception to the exclusionary rule applies to violations of Article I, section 17 of the 
Idaho Constitution." Koivu, 1 Idaho at 511-1 Similarly, the State has not shown 
any ground here for adopting the minority approach as a good-faith exception to Idaho's 
exclusionary rule. The majority approach preserves Idaho's exclusionary rule. 
The majority approach, because it fulfills the reasonableness requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment while maintaining separation of powers, treating officers and 
citizens with fundamental fairness, and preserving Idaho's exclusionary rule, should 
adopted this Court. An officer's law renders a detention 
unreasonable. Thus, 11igley's misapprehension of I. § 49-808(2) was a 
mistake of law, and his mistake of law rendered the stop per se unreasonable. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, as well as the reasons contained in the Appellant's Brief, 
Mr. Brooks respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order of 
probation on withheld judgment, reverse the district court's order denying the motion to 
suppress, and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings. 
DATED this 1ih day of June, 2014. 
BEN P. MCGREEVY 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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